As immigrant populations have swelled in recent decades, more and more children with limited English proficiency are enrolling in U.S. schools (McDonnell and Hill 1993; Terrazas and Fix 2009) . Today immigrants represent around 20 percent of children in elementary and secondary schools (Jost 2009) , with roughly half of these students considered English Language Learners (ELL). In addition to being one of the fast growing demographics in U.S. schools, ELL students continue to lag behind other students in educational achievement (Hernandez and Charney 1998; McPartland 1998) In fact, several studies argue that schools are one of the most responsive institutions when it comes to developing programs and policies to address the needs of immigrants (Marrow 2009; Odem 2008) . With schools serving as a primary venue for interaction between immigrants and the U.S. government, efforts to incorporate immigrant families sends messages to immigrant parents and the broader community regarding how Americans perceive immigrant groups, including the degree to which Americans value or fear diversity in this country, and what forms of accommodation and assistance immigrants should expect from their government (Newton 2005; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Soss 2000) . This school-level response stands in stark contrast to the increasingly nativist political environment in many states, which was evident in California's anti-immigrant "Save our State" movement in the early 1990s, as well as the more recent 2010 Arizona law containing the broadest and strictest immigration measures in generations (Archibold 2010a (Archibold , 2010b . It is even more surprising when we consider the increasingly intergovernmental political context in which publish schools operate.
Although schools, or at least districts, certainly retain the ability to choose instructional programs that meet the needs or preferences of their constituents, school-level practices are not determined by school-level officials alone. In addition to explicit directives and regulation, schools receive symbolic messages from federal and state policymakers that signal which approaches are most favored and which goals should be given priority by school-level policymakers (Newton 2005; Schneider and Ingram 1997) . In this study, we ask whether state policies constrain school-level efforts to accommodate ELL students-focusing on adoption of state-level English Only laws, which clearly endorse English monolingualism and asking whether this policy influences the way ELL students are instructed in local schools (e.g., in
English only versus students' native languages). We also consider whether the design of English
Only policies-particularly their scope -shapes the options available to school-level actors to resist state policies with which they disagree.
To address these questions, we combine data on the timing and nature of states' English Only laws with school-level data from the five waves of the Schools and Staffing Surveys (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1987 Statistics, -2003 . We look first at the direct effects of English Only laws on school-level policies regarding language instruction and hypothesize that schools will be less likely to offer bilingual and native language instruction following the enactment of English Only laws. We then consider whether and how bureaucratic preferences might condition the effects of these laws by asking whether co-ethnic teachers and principals (Latinos in our analyses) serve as cultural brokers for ELL students who resist the state policy and preserve instructional approaches that include bilingual education and accommodations for native language instruction (Marrow 2009; Meier and Stewart 1992; Meier, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1999).
Our findings indicate that instrumental aspects of English Only laws serve to constrain, but not eliminate, schools' use of bilingual instruction, while those sending only symbolic messages are less constraining. Further, while schools tend to act as responsible agents of state government, when state laws are vague in terms of policy scope and goals, we find less faithful adoption of an English monolingualism priority in schools with higher proportions of Latino teachers and/or a Latino principal. These findings echo other research investigating how political and bureaucratic interests co-exist in policy implementation, in this case, looking explicitly at this relationship in an intergovernmental context.
Language Education on the Frontline: Schools and Instructional Methods for ELLs
When it comes to instruction, there are a variety of methods for teaching ELL students, and schools typically rely on four in particular. While two of these methods provide little or no instruction in the students' native languages (English immersion and ESL or English as a second language), the other two (bilingual instruction and dual-language immersion) allow teachers and students to use students' native languages for all or some instructional content areas. Debates about which method of instruction is most effective are prevalent, but evidence seems to suggest that over the long term, more extended use of students' native languages leads to greater cognitive development and higher academic achievement (Datnow, Borman, Stringfield, Overman and Castellano 2003; Jost 2009 On the other hand, the proportion of schools noting that they offer native language instruction dropped steadily over this period, from a high of 20 percent in 1987 to a low of 5 percent in
2003.
ii These trends are counter to changes in the proportion of limited English proficient students over this period. Indeed, the mean proportion of LEP students reported by schools in the Schools and Staffing surveys increased 200 percent from 1987 to 2007 (from 2 to 6 percent).
What explains these contradictory trends? As we discuss below, one likely factor is the changing political climate and the increasingly hostile attitudes of Americans toward the non-English proficient in particular, and immigrants more generally.
Language Policy in the U.S.: Linguistic Assimilation, English Monolingualism
Language policy in the U.S. has always been contentious, involving issues of identity, citizenship, and even patriotism. Though the U.S. has never had an official language policy, federal policy has tended to promote linguistic assimilation and English monolingualism rather than multiculturalism and bilingualism. This tendency can be observed going back at least as far as the turn of the last century, when the first wave of foreign immigration to the U.S. reached its pinnacle and Congress passed legislation that not only reduced the flow of immigrants, but also made English proficiency a requirement for citizenship (Linton 2004; Piatt 1990) . By the middle of the twentieth century, linguistic assimilation had taken root and the notion that immigrants should assimilate as quickly as possible to English and by the third generation abandon entirely their native languages had become powerfully entrenched (Linton 2004:282 (Galindo and Vigil 2006; Santoro 1999) .
English Only Laws and Language Instruction
Research suggests that adoption of English Only laws has been closely tied to resentment toward immigrants and racial/ethnic minorities (Schildkraut 2001 Because English Only laws do not contain specific provisions for funding, enforcement, or implementation (Galindo and Vigil 2006) and they provide little material benefit to the English speaking population that supports them (Citrin, Reingold, Walters and Green 1990) , they are often viewed as symbolic policies whose primary effect is to de-value language pluralism and establish English-speaking as a prerequisite for engagement in the broader community. These symbolic messages can serve as powerful forces institutionalizing particular policy approaches and reinforcing socially constructed notions of which groups deserve governmental responsiveness and which do not (Pierson 2000; Schneider and Ingram 1997, 2005) . In fact, these symbolic messages have been particularly critical for the social construction of immigrants in U.S. society. Newton (2005) emphasizes how susceptible immigrants are to elite socialconstructions-as deserving or undeserving of governmental accommodation.
Yet, a few states have enacted English Only laws that extend beyond symbolic policy (and beyond basic changes in state practices such as the printing of forms in English alone) to explicitly include language instruction in public schools (Feder 2007; Galindo and Vigil 2006 
School Resistance to English Only Laws: Loyal Agents or Rogue Bureaucrats?
Despite the traditional political control model of policy implementation, the school-level implementation of either instrumental or symbolic messages in state policies is not guaranteed, automatic, or straightforward. School officials, like other "street-level bureaucrats," operate in a relatively autonomous environment that provides considerable discretion, and thus power, when it comes to policy implementation (Elmore 1979; Lipsky 1980) . Further, elected officials have limited time, resources, and expertise to devote to effectively and efficiently overseeing and managing bureaucratic agents (Friedrich 1940) . Therefore, an alternative decision-making model, one of bureaucratic control, suggests that school-level agents serve as their own guides, making decisions about instructional methods based on their own priorities and values, with considerable immunity from the policy messages sent by state policies (see e.g., Datnow 2000) .
Although the bureaucratic control model has only occasionally been applied to study the beliefs about fairness and appropriate action toward their clients encouraged them to view themselves as advocates for these clients rather than for the system. This led school administrators and teachers to sometimes "ignore, stretch, bend, and if need be, break restrictive government policies in order to provide 'more-than-routine' services for newcomer clients" (759). For example, in both of the rural counties she studied, districts had hired bilingual/ESL staff, despite substantial costs, and had established policies to encourage Latino parental involvement in their children's education (Marrow 2009, 761) .
We test for this dynamic via an alternative to our second hypothesis: schools will resist
messages in state English Only laws and continue to provide bilingual and native language instruction after the adoption of an English Only law in their state, this resistance will be greater for laws containing only symbolic messages than for those with instrumental messages (H3).

School Resistance to English Only Laws: Variation in Schools' Response
A number of factors are likely to influence whether schools respond to, rather than resist, state policy conveying a negative social construction of immigrants (e.g., English Only laws), which serve to move the agent (the school) away from bilingual and native language instruction to exclusive reliance on English immersion or ESL methods. These include the broader context in which the school operates, such as centralization at the district and state level, and the level of funding for bilingual education, as well as the supply of teachers for ELL students. Although we acknowledge the importance of this context, we focus on one particularly salient aspect of the school context: the preferences of school-level actors themselves. Not surprisingly, research examining language policy implementation has found that preferences of local stakeholders play an important role in compliance. For example, analysis of district-level compliance to Prop 227
in California (the initiative that mandated reduction or elimination of bilingual education in public schools) found that districts with superintendents of Hispanic origin were less likely to comply (Bali 2003) , as were districts with large numbers of bilingual staff (Gandara et al. 2000) .
As these examples illustrate, school personnel often serve as "cultural brokers" for immigrant and ELL students and parents. Cultural brokers have important connections to the underrepresented groups they serve, typically through mutual history, shared socio-cultural experiences, or membership in the same racial or ethnic groups (Achinstein and Aguirre 2008; Nieto 2000) . Studies have shown that the cultural connection between teachers and their students has positive effects on achievement, including reductions in drop-out rates and disciplinary action, increases in college attendance (Meier and England 1984; Fraga, Meier, and England 1986) , the promotion of positive role models (Good 1981) , the provision of culturally relevant teaching (Achinstein and Aguiree 2008) , and increases in outreach to minority and immigrant parents Marschall, Shah, and Donato 2010 Further, we expect that the design of any English Only law will structure the opportunities that street-level bureaucrats have for resisting its implementation. We acknowledge that many design elements may serve to shape these opportunities, including the degree of monitoring employed by the principle and the centralization of the system (Elmore 1979) . In this paper, we focus on one such design element: the scope of the law, particularly its goals vis-à-vis K-12 education. Matland (1995) emphasizes the importance of goal specificity versus ambiguity in structuring the politics surrounding implementation of high-conflict policies such as English
Only laws. He notes how clearly defined policies are easier to implement since those in power are better able to monitor and force compliance. Yet, when the scope of a policy is ambiguous or vague, implementation depends on the preferences of local political coalitions who control the policy's success, as well as how local actors translate the abstract goal of a policy into specific actions (Elmore 1979; Matland 1995 
Methodology
We test these hypotheses using data on school language instructional practices gathered as part of the federal Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) during five school years : 1987-1988, 1990-1991, 1993-1994, 1999-2000, and 2003-2004 . In the following sections we describe our measures of state English Only laws, and school-level ELL instructional strategies.
English Only Laws
We Additionally, we coded each law for whether the law explicitly addressed the use of English in K-12 education, and if so, whether the law explicitly included or excluded K-12 educational practice. Laws in which we could not discern coverage of language instruction in K-12 schools were coded as vague regarding their applicability to education.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 1 presents our coding of each state English Only law, divided into three groups based on the scope of the law-specifically whether the law explicitly included education in its scope, excluded education, or was vague on the degree to which the English Only law applied to K-12 education. We generated a simple indicator variable for whether the state had enacted any of the three types of English Only laws, as well as a set of three variables that disaggregate the laws into these three categories: includes education (19 percent of laws), excludes education (25 percent of laws), and vague regarding education (57 percent of the laws). As described in more detail in the analytic strategy section, we estimate parallel models using first the measure of any English Only law and then the set of three variables capturing the differing scope of these laws.
SASS Data on School Language Instruction Policies and Practices
To measure our dependent variables, school practices with regard to language instruction for ELLs, we relied on NCES Schools and Staffing (SASS) data, which are national surveys administered roughly every four years to a representative sample of all public U.S. elementary and secondary schools. We used these data to construct all other school-level variables as well.
Note that since this study examines how state language policies affect school-level language instructional practices for ELLs, we restricted our analyses to schools reporting at least some (>0) ELL students. This selection rule yielded a sample of roughly18,000 schools across the five SASS waves, which span the period 1987-88 to 2003-04.
To operationalize our dependent variables, we focused on survey questions regarding both English language and subject matter instruction. Because the wording of these questions changed slightly after the 1993-94 survey, we relied on two different specifications of our dependent variable. For the first, Language Instruction 1 (LI 1), we included separate categories for schools with no special instruction for ELL students (Y=0), ESL programs or services where ELL student are provided with intensive instruction in English (Y=1), and bilingual/native language education in which the native language is used to varying degrees in instructing ELL students (Y=2). Since the ESL/bilingual questions were combined starting in 1999-2000, we relied on a question that asked whether ELL students were taught subject matter courses in their native language to code for bilingual/native language instruction for the last two waves of the survey (1999-2000 and 2003-2004 To operationalize the key construct of the professional values and shared interests captured by research on bureaucratic control and "cultural brokers," we employed variables that measured the racial/ethnic makeup of the teaching faculty representing the largest immigrant groups in the U.S (percent Latino and percent Asian), while also including a control for African Americans (percent Black). We also included a set of dummy variables indicating the presence of minority (Latino, Asian, Black) principals (1=yes, 0 otherwise), since they not only serve as cultural brokers, but also have authority over defining school language instructional policy.
[ Table 2 about here]
Data for Control Variables
While the key explanatory variables in this analysis represent the state language policies and school-level measures of the professional values and interests of local agents, our empirical models also include a host of both state-and school-level control variables to capture other factors that may influence the relationship between state-level language policy and school-level responses. School-level Characteristics include variables tapping the racial/ethnic composition of students in the school (percent Asian, percent Black, percent Hispanic), as well as measures of students' socio-economic status (percent free lunch students) and language instructional needs (percent LEP students). In addition, controls for school size and location (suburban and rural, with central city schools representing the excluded category) are included, as are measures for charter schools (1=yes; 0 otherwise) and elementary schools (1=yes; 0 otherwise).
Analytic Strategy
Since the dependent variables for our empirical models are discrete, we estimated ordered logit (for Language Instruction1, or LI 1) and logistic (for Language Instruction2 or LI 2) models with both state-and year-fixed effects. In addition, because our primary independent variables, state language policies, are measured at the state-year (or state-wave) level, we clustered our standard errors for this analytic N of 250 state-years. These robust standard errors are presented for all models. The advantage of a fixed-effects approach is that it absorbs the invariant characteristics of states (and time points) that may matter for school-level language instructional practices, as well as the effect of state language policies. viii As a result, we did not control for stable characteristics of states, such as region, history of immigration, or previous language policy. Similarly, we did not control for important national events, such as enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act, since its effect was absorbed in the dummy variables for the years following this policy change. This modeling approach does not account for time-varying characteristics of states and so we included the state-level control variables described earlier.
[ Table 3 about here]
Findings
In our first set of models, we estimated the direct effect of state English Only laws on school-level provision of bilingual education. These findings support our first hypothesis that state-level English Only laws serve to constrain local-level provision of bilingual education. And they address our conflicting hypotheses 2 and 3 by illustrating how this negative effect is most pronounced for laws explicitly focusing on education practice (which send both instrumental and symbolic messages, rather than symbolic messages alone). Notably, laws that were vague in scope did not serve to alter the practices of school-level personnel. To illustrate the magnitude of these effects, we estimated predicted probabilities for each measure of language instruction in a school with average values on each of the control variables, including the percent ELL students (8 percent).
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 presents these predicted probabilities of bilingual instruction (LI 1) for an average school in a state with no law versus any English Only law, and for each of the three scopes of English Only laws. In the absence of an English Only law, the average school has a 20 percent probability of providing bilingual instruction. However, this probability is reduced to 15 percent if the state adopted any form of English Only law. The magnitude of this reduction varies though by the scope of the law-with a predicted probability of 11 percent if the state has a law including education, 14 percent if the law excludes education, and 17 percent if the law is vague regarding its applicability to education. The same pattern of findings holds for the alternative specification of the dependent variable (LI 2). ix The magnitude of these findings can be viewed as evidence of a substantial decrease in bilingual instruction-a nearly 50 percent reduction following enactment of a law that focuses on education. However, it is also worth noting that even the enactment of an English Only law that includes education was not completely successful in eliminating bilingual instruction in public schools.
[ Table 4 about here]
We then tested our expectation in Hypothesis 4 that the impact of state English Only laws on school-level language instruction would vary according to the extent to which "cultural brokers" were present in local schools. Specifically, we hypothesized that schools with more cultural brokers, who are likely to oppose monolingualism, would be less likely to alter existing instructional practices in order to conform with English Only policy, and thus more likely to continue offering bilingual instruction. To test this, we re-estimated the full set of models in Table 3 including an interaction between the English Only policy and the percent of teachers who are Latino. We then estimated the full set of models again replacing the interaction terms with interactions between the state policy variables and an indicator of a Latino principal. The results of this model are presented in Table 4 .
The key coefficients of interest are those for the interaction terms. We find no significant interaction between our measure of any English Only law and the presence of cultural brokers (teachers or the principal). Instead, the degree to which cultural brokers serve to condition the effect of English Only laws (i.e. by resisting its implementation) depends on the scope of the English Only law. Most notably, as expected in Hypothesis 5, for vague English Only laws, we find a significant, positive interaction with the percent Latino teachers (b=1.74, se=.49; b=1.31, se=.64), as well as a similar, but less robust, pattern of positive coefficients for the interactions with Latino principals (b=.37, se=.19; b=.14, se=.22). Interestingly, it was the vague English
Only laws that had no direct impact on language instruction-suggesting that any effect of these laws was dependent on the presence or absence of cultural brokers in the school-with a larger decrease in schools with fewer Latino teachers. Additionally, we find a marginally significant, negative interaction between the percent of Latino teachers and the enactment of an English Only law that includes education (b=-.97, se=.55, b=-1.54, se=.88)-suggesting that laws with clear policy messages can be constraining (resulting in less bilingual instruction) even in schools where the presence of cultural brokers is stronger (greater proportions of Latino teachers).
[ Figure 2 about here]
To illustrate these two conditional effect, Figure 2 presents the predicted probability of We bring together these findings in Figures 3, which presents the predicted probability of each type of English Only law on bilingual instruction (LI 1) in a school with no Latino teachers, 10 percent Latino teachers, or 20 percent Latino teachers. Here we compare these estimates by the scope of the law, illustrating how a law that includes education leads to a significant decline in bilingual instruction regardless of the presence of cultural brokers. An English Only law that excludes education also seems to constrain language instruction, but to a lesser (and marginally significant) degree. In contrast, the effect of vague English Only laws depends on the presence of Latino teachers with little to no effect in the absence of Latino teachers, but a positive influence-serving to spur more bilingual instruction-in a school with more cultural brokers.
Conclusions
In this study, we examined school-level responses to state-level adoption of English Only laws. Our findings indicate that schools' ELL instructional strategies do shift following enactment of a state-level English Only law. In particular, enactment of English Only law reduces the likelihood that schools offer native language instruction and increases the likelihood that they either rely strictly on ESL methods or provide no special instruction for ELL students at all. However, this effect is most pronounced for English Only laws that explicitly include-or even specifically target-K-12 education, suggesting that the instrumental messages directing schools to reduce bilingual education are adhered to by most schools even when the symbolic messages face greater resistance.
Further, the level of school-level resistance to the monolingualism message varies according to both the scope of the law and the presence of Latino teachers and principals. These findings suggest that policy design and the preferences of local actors together shape the decisions schools make regarding which instructional methods to employ in servicing the needs of ELL students. Resistance to symbolic messages sent by English Only laws is more likely in schools with Latino cultural brokers, and the ability of cultural brokers to resist negative messages conveyed by State English Only laws is greater when the law is vague in scope.
Although this study did not consider all of plausible factors that potentially shape school-level actors' incentives or capacity to resist English Only laws (e.g., the degree to which school systems are centralized; funding and/or enforcement provisions in the laws), it makes important theoretical and empirical contributions to a growing body of work that seeks to better understanding the conditions under which school-level actors behave as loyal agents for state policy or rogue bureaucrats establishing policy on their own (Jones-Correa 2008; Marrow 2009; Odem 2008) . Our findings support a bureaucratic notion of control in which school-level agents identify as policymakers themselves-making decisions about the language accommodations most important for their school population. Yet, this role is more constrained when state policy specifically targets the behavior of local actors (in this case educators), while state policies that are more vague in scope seem to allow room for street-level bureaucrats to interpret the policy in different ways to justify different efforts at implementation. This "proliferation of interpretations" (Matland 1995, p. 168) is not surprising in the context of an ambiguous policy goal, which devolves the power to shape implementation to street-level actors.
In the context of immigrants and ELLs, our findings present both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. On the one hand, evidence from our study suggests that in more can and sometimes do act as rogue bureaucrats in responding to the needs of immigrant and ELL students, our study suggests that state English Only laws may make such actions the exception rather than the rule. In other words, when it comes to language instruction for ELLs, the political and social incorporation of immigrant and ELLs groups in the local community may play a bigger role in determining the capacity of school-level actors to act as rogue bureaucrats than has been recognized by previous studies. Note: Bars represent the predicted probability of a school providing bilingual education (LI 1), by the percent of the school's teachers who are Latino. Estimated for a state with no English Only law, an English Only law that includes education, an English Only law that excludes education, and an English Only law that is vague re: education. All other variables are estimated at their mean value. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval of each estimate.
